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Abstract:
Purpose: This paper investigates the influence of  channel structures and channel coordination
on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of  two different kinds of
marketing models: the common retailer and the exclusive shop. 
Design/methodology/approach: With suppliers who manufacture the alternative
commodities and retailers in the dual-channel supply chains as the object of  the research, this
paper compares suppliers' profits, consumer utility without coordination and contrasts
suppliers' and retailers' profits with coordination to determine the range of  the revenue sharing
rates and which parameters are related.
Findings: The analysis suggests the preference lists of  the supplier and the retailer over
channel structures with and without coordination are different, and depend on parameters like
channel basic demand, channel cost and channel substitutability.
Originality/value: In this research, new sales model for two suppliers should choose the same
retailer or the exclusive retailers to sell their commodities.
Keywords: supply chain selection, supply chain coordination, profits, Pareto zone
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1. Introduction
In current market environment, the competition among different commodities is becoming
more and more fierce. Therefore, for the competitive suppliers, how to choose the structure of
the supply chain to increase their own profits and realize the efficiency of entire supply chain
seem particularly important. In addition, the suppliers can also cooperate with the downstream
retailers to increase their profits, at the same time; retailers tend to make agreements with
suppliers to increase their profits, too.
Supplier can sell their commodities through the exclusive shops. For instance, because of its
long history and unique brewing process, Maotai is known as the "national wine". Guizhou
Maotai group has adopted the marketing mode of Maotai liquor chain stores. As the famous
mobile phone manufacturers, Samsung and Apple phones also choose brand stores to sell their
commodities. At the same time, suppliers can choose the common retailer to sell their
commodities as well. For example, Samsung and Apple not only select the exclusive shops to
sell commodities but also put them in the malls such as Gome or Suning who sell the
competitors' commodities, too.
The purpose of this paper is to solve the problem in reality, which is without coordination which
supply chains the two competitive suppliers should choose to sell their commodities, the
common or the exclusive shop, and which kind of structure can bring more profits to suppliers
or bring more benefits to consumers. In the case of coordination, whether suppliers and
retailers can mutually benefit from the revenue sharing contracts or not and how to determine
the range of the revenue sharing rates and which parameters are related.
On the basis of two suppliers who manufacture alternative commodities in dual-channel supply
chain, this paper studies the influence of suppliers’ profits and the consumer utility without
coordination and suppliers' and retailers' profits with coordination under different channel
structures. In different market environments, this paper models, optimizes and compares the
issue that suppliers should how to choose the sales structures. Through the comparison of the
supplier's profits and the whole efficiency of supply chain, this paper provides the foundation
for decision-making for the managers of enterprises. Besides, this paper also gets the ranges
of revenue sharing rates which supplier and retailer can gain more profits from coordination.
This paper focuses on the selection and cooperation of the dual-channel supply chain. Thus,
related literature includes multichannel supply chain competition and cooperation. The
literature on multichannel supply chains includes whether a supplier should add a direct
channel to its existing retail channel. According to Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003), it is
beneficial for a supplier to set up a direct channel to compete with its retailer in a model,
assuming that consumers have a common positive preference for the local retailer. Chiang et
al. (2003) also reports a Pareto zone where both the supplier and the retailer can be better off
after the supplier enters the direct channel. The same conclusion is further demonstrated in
Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007). Our paper follows this trend but from a different
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perspective with asymmetric base demand in two channels and explores this feature in
situations with and without coordination.
Indeed, there has been a large volume of literature focused on channel competition. In a
duopoly common retailer channel model, Choi (1996) demonstrates the differences among
three game settings, including two Stackelberg games and a vertical Nash game. In a seminal
work on a dual exclusive channel, McGuire and Staelin (1983) provide an explanation on why a
supplier would want to use an intermediary retailer in the context of two supply chains with
one supplier in each chain. Through the theory of channel control, Bucklin (1973) suggests the
degree of coordination among players is a measure of the competitive position of that supply
chain from the perspectives of payoff, middleman tolerance, and others. EI-Ansary (1974)
relaxes some assumptions of Bucklin (1973) and points out that the balanced point of channel
power is the interactive result of the channel members. Etgar (1978) empirically suggests a
channel control mix aiming for a proper and efficient design of channel control tools for
leaders. Nevertheless, the above literature has not explicitly compared the efficacy of different
supply chain structures, especially a dual-channel with one common retailer channel and two
exclusive retailers’ channel, with and without coordination.
The literature on channel coordination is very rich. In a seminal paper on channel coordination,
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) discuss difficulties, mechanisms, and solutions in a coordinated
system. They also conclude that a quantity discount contract can coordinate the supply chain.
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) generalize a stepwise price-discount-sharing table to a linear
wholesale price scheme for non-competing retailers and a non-linear wholesale price scheme
for competing retailers. Together with a buyback contract, they demonstrate that a price-
discount-sharing wholesale price contract can coordinate a supply chain with demand
uncertainty. In a model with a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, Ingene and
Parry (1995a) demonstrate that a two-part tariff wholesale pricing policy can fully coordinate
the channels. Ingene and Parry (1995b) also point out that the manufacture, however, will
prefer the second-best two-part tariff to a menu of two-part tariffs maximizing the channel
profits. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) apply a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply
chain with a supplier and a retailer or multiple symmetric retailers competing in quantities. In
their model, the supplier and the retailer agree on the revenue sharing percentage and the
wholesale price before the retailer determines the optimal order quantity and retail price. They
also compare the revenue sharing contract to others and demonstrate that the revenue
sharing contract can coordinate a broad array of supply chains. Indeed, many other contract
forms have been widely discussed in recent years. One can refer to Cachon (2003) and Tsay,
Nahmias and Agrawal (1999) for surveys of contracts for a wide range of supply chain models.
However, the above literature has not explicitly addressed full coordination of a dual-channel
supply chain including one common retailer and two exclusive retailers. Moreover, few papers
have focused on the efficacy of different supply chain structures, especially the impact of the
numbers of retailers on the suppliers, the retailers and the entire supply chain, in situations of
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coordination. In this paper, we utilize the revenue sharing contract to demonstrate that
negotiation power between the supplier and the retailer of different supply chain structures.
Different from the above researches, Cai(2010) from a different perspective with asymmetric
base demand in two channels and explores this feature in situation with and without
coordination; explicitly compared the efficacy of different supply chain structures, especially a
dual-channel with a retail channel and either a direct channel or a second retail channel, with
and without coordination; utilized the revenue sharing contract to demonstrate that
negotiation power between the supplier and the retailer varies over different supply chain
structures. Cai (2010) investigates the influence of channel structures and channel
coordination on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of two
single-channels and two dual-channel supply chain. His analysis suggests the preference lists
of the supplier and the retailer over channel structures with and without coordination are
different, and depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel operational costs, and
channel substitutability. 
Based on the dual-channel model Cai (2010), this paper establishes two dual-channel sales
models: one is common retailer sales model; the other is exclusive shop sales model. Different
from above literature researches, this paper introduces two competing suppliers, and
establishes the dual-channel structure models that the suppliers as the main body of the
supply chains. Previous literature researches are focused on the retailers, and the two retailers
sharing one supplier, in order to compare whether the supplier should add a direct channel or
not. But this paper is focused on that two suppliers should choose the same retailer or the
exclusive retailers to sell their commodities, and compare these two sales structures. In the
case of with and without contracts, compares the profits of the supplier and the retailer, and
determine how to distribute the profits in order to make suppliers and retailers benefit from
the coordination.
2. Modeling Denotations
Based on two suppliers who manufacture alternative commodities in dual-channel supply
chains, this paper studies the influence of suppliers’ profits and the consumer utility under
different sales structures without coordination. For example, the supplier can choose the "the
common retailer" sales structure, or "the exclusive shop" sales structure. And investigates how
to determine the proportion of revenue sharing rates with coordination in order to increase
both suppliers’ and retailers' profits when the suppliers cooperate with the retailers, and the
overall supply chain profits is greater than the condition without coordination. Dual-channel
structure diagram is shown in Figure 1.
For the sake of simplicity, the C involved in this paper represents "the common retailer" sales
structure; also the E involved in this paper represents "the exclusive shop" sales structure.
Following signs need to be defined during modeling in this paper:
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pi: is the unit retail price of commodity (i = 1,2), where p1 represents the commodity
price of supplier s1, and p2 represents the commodity price of supplier s2.
wi: is the unit wholesale price of commodity (i = 1,2), where w1 represents the wholesale
price of supplier s1, and w2 represents the wholesale price of supplier s2.
Di: is the demand of retailers (i = r1, r2), where Dr1 represents the demand of retailer r1,
and Dr2 represents the demand of retailer r2.
cr1: is the channel operational cost of one exclusive retailer r1.
cr2: is the channel operational cost of the other exclusive retailer r2.
cr: is the channel operational cost of the common retailer r.
ai: is the base demand of commodity i (i = 1,2), where a1 represents the base demand of
supplier s1’s commodities, and a2 represents the base demand of supplier s2’s
commodities.
b: is the rate of change of marginal utility and is normalized to one in the sequel for
brevity.
q: is channel substitutability (0 ≤ q <1)
r: is revenue sharing rate of supplier (0 < r < 1)
Figure 1. Dual-channel structure
Because consumers usually buy commodities depending on the quantity of the consumer
surplus, therefore many literatures established the demand function through the consumer
utility theory in dual-channel supply chain. This paper adopts the consumer utility function of
Cai (2010), establishes the demand function according to consumer utility function, and
assumes that the base demand is always exceed channel operational cost. The channel
substitutability q is in the range of 0 to 1, and scenario C’s channel operational cost is relatively
lower than the scenario E’s, so supposed cr ≤ cr1, cr ≤ cr2.
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3. Comparison of Suppliers’ Profits under Different Channel Structures without
Coordination
3.1. “The Common Retailer” Dual-Channel Structure Model (C)
In the common retailer channel structure, it is assumed that two competitive suppliers choose
the same retailer to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a i Di−
bD i
2
2
)−θ Dr 1Dr 2−∑ pi D i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2: Dr 1−c=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−c=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−C=Dr 1−C
✳w1
Πs2−C=Dr 2−C
✳w2
The common retailer's profit function can be indicated as:
Πr−C=Dr 1−C (p1−w1−c r )+Dr 2−C(p2−w2−c r)
Lemma 1. The profit functions Πs1−C ,Πs 2−C are concave to w1, w2, and their optimal solution
are:
w1−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r+(2−θ
2)a 1−θ a2
4−θ 2
w2−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r−θ a 1+(2−θ
2)a 2
4−θ 2
The profit function Πr−C is concave to p1, p2, and their optimal solutions are:
p1−C
✳ =
(2+θ )c r−2 (−3+θ
2)a 1−θ a 2
4−θ 2
p2−C
✳ =
(2+θ )c r−θ a 1−2 (−3+θ
2)a 2
2(4−θ 2)
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Based on the optimal price, the optimal demand is Dr 1−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r−(−2+θ
2)a 1−θ a 2
2(4−5θ 2+θ 4)
, and
the optimal profit is ΠS 1−C=
[(2−θ−θ 2)cr+θ a 2+(θ
2−2)a 1]
2
2(θ 2−4)2(1−θ 2)
.
3.2. “The Exclusive Shop” Dual-Channel Structure Model (E)
In the exclusive shop channel structure, it is assumed that two competitive suppliers choose
their own retailers to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a i Di−
bD i
2
2
)−θ Dr 1Dr 2−∑ piD i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2:
Dr 1−E=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−E=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−E=Dr 1−E
✳w1
Πs2−E=Dr 2−E
✳w2
The exclusive retailers’ profit functions can be indicated as:
Πr 1−E=Dr 1−E(p1−w1−cr 1)
Πr 2−E=Dr 2−E (p2−w2−c r 2)
Lemma 2. The profit functions Πs1−E ,Πs2−E are concave to w1, w2 and their optimal solution
are:
w1−E
✳ =
(−8+9θ 2−2θ 4)c r 1−θ (−2+θ
2)c r 2+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a1+θ (−2+θ
2)a 2
16−17θ 2+4θ 4
w2−E
✳ =
θ (2−θ 2)c r 1+(−8+9θ
2−2θ 4)c r 2+θ (−2+θ
2)a 1+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a 2
16−17θ 2+4θ 4
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The profit functions Πr 1−E ,Πr 2−E are concave to p1, p2, and their optimal solutions are:
p1−E
✳ =
(16−14θ 2+3θ 4)c r 1−2 (−3+θ
2)(−θ (−2+θ 2)cr+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a 1+θ (−2+θ
2)a2)
64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6
p2−E
✳ =
(−2+θ 2)(2θ (−3+θ 2)c r 1+(−8+3θ
2)cr 2−2θ (−3+θ
2)a 1)−2(−3+θ
2)(8−9θ 2+2θ 4)a 2
64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6
Based on the optimal price, it can be known the optimal demand is:
Dr 1−E
✳ =
(−2+θ 2)((8−9θ 2+2θ 4)c r 1+θ (−2+θ
2)c r 2+(−8+9θ
2−2θ 4)a 1−θ (−2+θ
2)a 2)
64−148θ 2+117θ 4−37θ 6+4θ 8
, and the optimal
profit is: ΠS 1−E=
(2−θ 2) [θ (θ 2−2)(c r 2−a 2)+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)(c r 1−a1)]
2
(θ 4−5θ 2+4)(4θ 4−17θ 2+16)2
.
4. Comparison of Two Different Channel Structures Without Coordination
4.1. Profits Comparative Analysis on Scenario E and Scenario C
For the comparison of suppliers’ profits under different channel structures, according to the
different channel cost, they can be divided into three kinds of circumstances. The first
circumstance is that the channel costs are equal to zero; the second, channel costs are not
equal to zero and Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr; the last, channel cost are not equal to zero and Cr1 = Cr2 ≠ Cr. 
4.1.1. Channel Costs Are Zero
According to the different base demand, each circumstance can be divided into three kinds:
the base demand for supplier s1 is less than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 ; the base demand for
supplier s1 and supplier s2 ’s are equal, namely
a 1
a 2
=1 ; the base demand for supplier s1 is large
than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 . 
Theorem 1. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
If Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr = 0, then ΠE ΠC . It means that for supplier scenario E outperforms scenario C
(as shown in Table 1).
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When
a 1
a 2
1 When
a 1
a 2
=1 When
a 1
a 2
1
ΠE ΠC ΠE ΠC ΠE ΠC
Table 1. The profit comparison of different base demands
Based on the above conclusion, can be concluded that when channel costs are zero, the profits
of scenario E always outperforms scenario C no matter how the base demands changed. In
numerical example, channel substitutability is selected as the independent variable and a1 = 5,
a2 = 10 (as shown in Figure 2).
Figure 2.The comparison of suppliers’ profits in scenario E and scenario C
4.1.2. Channel Costs Are Equal to Each Other and Not Zero
Theorem 2. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
If Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr ≠ 0, then ΠE ΠC . It means that for supplier scenario E outperforms scenario C
(as shown in Table 2).
When
a 1
a 2
1 When
a 1
a 2
=1 When
a 1
a 2
1
ΠE ΠC ΠE ΠC ΠE ΠC
Table 2. The profit comparison of different base demands
Based on the above conclusion, can be concluded that when channel costs are equal to each
other, the profits of scenario E always outperforms scenario C no matter how the base
demands changed. In numerical example, channel substitutability is selected as the
independent variable and a1 = 5, a2 = 10 (as shown in Figure 3).
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Figure 3. The comparison of suppliers’ profits in scenario E and scenario C
4.1.3. Channel Costs Are Not Equal to Each Other and Not Zero
Theorem 3. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
In the case that Cr1 = Cr2 ≠ Cr ≠ 0, can be obtained: if the value of q is smaller, then ΠC ΠE , it
means that for supplier scenario C outperforms scenario E; if the value of q is bigger, then
ΠE ΠC , it means that for supplier scenario E outperforms scenario C (as shown in Table 3). 
Range of q When
a 1
a 2
1 Range of q When
a 1
a 2
=1 Range of q When
a 1
a 2
1
q  [0,0.37] ΠC ΠE q  [0,0.36] ΠC ΠE q  [0,0.34] ΠC ΠE
q  [0.37, 0.60] ΠE ΠC q  [0.36, 0.60] ΠE ΠC q  [0.34, 0.60] ΠE ΠC
Table 3. The profit comparison of different base demands
Based on the above conclusion, can be concluded that when channel costs are not equal to
each other and zero, the profits of the two different channel structures depended on the
change of channel substitutability q, for suppliers, when the range of q is smaller, then scenario
C ≻ scenario E; otherwise, scenario E ≻ scenario C. In numerical example, channel
substitutability is selected as the independent variable and a1 = 5, a2 = 10 (as shown in Figure
4).
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Figure 4. The comparison of suppliers’ profits in scenario E and scenario C
4.2. Consumer Utility Comparative Analysis on Scenario E and Scenario C
For the comparison of suppliers’ profits under different channel structures, this paper divided
into three kinds of circumstances according to the different channel cost. The first
circumstance is that the channel cost equals zero; the second, channel cost are not equal to
zero and Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr; the last, channel cost are not equal to zero and Cr1 = Cr2 ≠ Cr. 
4.2.1. Channel Costs Are Zero
According to the different basic demand, each circumstance can be divided into three kinds:
the base demand for supplier s1 is less than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 ; the base demand for
supplier s1 and supplier s2 ’s are equal, namely
a 1
a 2
=1 ; the base demand for supplier s1 is large
than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 .
Theorem 4. I n order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
If Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr = 0, then UE > UC. It means that for consumer scenario E outperforms scenario
C (as shown in Table 4).
When
a 1
a 2
1 When
a 1
a 2
=1 When
a 1
a 2
1
UE > UC UE > UC UE > UC
Table 4. The consumer utility comparison of different base demands
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Based on the above conclusion, it can be concluded that when channel costs are zero, the
consumer utility of scenario E always outperforms scenario C no matter how the base demands
changed. In numerical example, channel substitutability is selected as the independent
variable and a1 = 5, a2 = 10 (as shown in Figure 5).
Figure 5. The comparison of consumer utility in scenario E and scenario C
4.2.2. Channel Costs Are not Equal to Each Other and Not Zero
Theorem 5. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
If Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr ≠ 0, then UE > UC. It means that for consumer scenario E outperforms scenario
C (as shown in Table 5).
When
a 1
a 2
1 When
a 1
a 2
=1 When
a 1
a 2
1
UE > UC UE > UC UE > UC
Table 5. The consumer utility comparison of different base demands
Based on the above conclusion, it can be concluded that when channel costs are equal to each
other, the consumer utility of scenario E always outperforms scenario C no matter how the
base demands changed. In numerical example, channel substitutability is selected as the
independent variable and a1 = 5, a2 = 10 (as shown in Figure 6).
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Figure 6. The comparison of consumer utility in scenario E and scenario C
4.2.3. Channel Costs Are not Equal to Each Other and Not Zero
Theorem 6. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60).
In the case that Cr1 = Cr2 ≠ Cr ≠ 0, can be obtained: if the value of q is smaller, then UC > UE, it
means that for supplier scenario C outperforms scenario E; if the value of q is bigger, then
UE > UC, it means that for supplier scenario E outperforms scenario C (as shown in Table 6).
Range of q When
a 1
a 2
1 Range of q When
a 1
a 2
=1 Range of q When
a 1
a 2
1
q  [0,0.58] UC > UE q  [0,0.41] UC > UE q  [0,0.31] UC > UE
q  [0.58, 0.60] UE > UC q  [0.41, 0.60] UE > UC q  [0.31, 0.60] UE > UC
Table 6. The consumer utility comparison of different base demands
Based on the above conclusion, it can be concluded that when channel costs are not equal to
each other and zero, the consumer utility of the two different channel structures depended on
the change of channel substitutability q, for consumers, when the range of q is smaller, then
scenario C ≻ scenario E; otherwise, scenario E ≻ scenario C. In numerical example, channel
substitutability is selected as the independent variable and a1=5, a2=10 (as shown in Figure 7).
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Figure 7. The comparison of consumer utility in scenario E and scenario C
5. Comparison of Suppliers’ and Retailers’ Profits under Different Channel Structures
with Coordination
5.1. “The Common Retailer” Dual-Channel Structure Model without Contract (C)
In the common retailer channel structure, it is assumed that two competing suppliers choose
the same retailer to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a iD i− bDi
2
2
)−θ Dr 1 Dr 2−∑ p iD i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2:
Dr 1−C=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−C=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−C=Dr 1−C
✳w1
Πs2−C=Dr 2−C
✳w2
The common retailer's profit function can be indicated as:
Pr-C = Dr1-C (p1 - w1 - cr) + Dr2-C (p2 - w2 - cr)
Lemma 1. The profit functions Πs1−C ,Πs 2−C are concave to w1, w2 and their optimal solution
are:
w1−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r+(2−θ
2)a 1−θ a2
4−θ 2
w2−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r−θ a 1+(2−θ
2)a 2
4−θ 2
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The profit function Pr-C is concave to p1, p2 and their optimal solutions are:
p1−C
✳ =
(2+θ )c r−2 (−3+θ
2)a 1−θ a 2
4−θ 2
p2−C
✳ =
(2+θ )c r−θ a 1−2 (−3+θ
2)a 2
2(4−θ 2)
Based on the optimal price, the optimal demand is Dr 1−C
✳ =
(−2+θ +θ 2)c r−(−2+θ
2)a 1−θ a 2
2(4−5θ 2+θ 4)
, the
optimal profit of supplier is ΠS 1−C=
[(2−θ−θ 2)cr+θ a 2+(θ
2−2)a1]
2
2(θ 2−4)2(1−θ 2)
, and the optimal profit of
retailer is:
ΠR1−C
✳ =
((−2+θ +θ 2)cr+2a 1+θ (θ a 1+a 2))(
(2+θ )c r−2a1−θ a 2
2 (−4+θ 2)
)+((−2+θ+θ 2)c r+2a2−θ (a 1+θ a 2))(
(2+θ )cr−θ a 1−2a2
2(−4+θ 2)
)
2 (−4−5θ 2+θ 4)
.
 
5.2. “The Exclusive Shop” Dual-Channel Structure Model without Contract (E)
In the exclusive shop channel structure, it is assumed that two competing suppliers choose
their own retailers to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a iD i− bDi
2
2
)−θ Dr 1 Dr 2−∑ p iD i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2:
Dr 1−E=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−E=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−E=Dr 1−E
✳w1
Πs2−E=Dr 2−E
✳w2
The exclusive retailers’ profit functions can be indicated as:
Pr1-E = Dr1-E (p1 - w1 - cr1)
Pr2-E = Dr2-E (p2 - w2 - cr2)
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Lemma 2. The profit functions Ps1-E, Ps2-E are concave to w1, w2 and their optimal solution are:
w1−E
✳ =
(−8+9θ 2−2θ 4)c r 1−θ (−2+θ
2)c r 2+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a1+θ (−2+θ
2)a 2
16−17θ 2+4θ 4
w2−E
✳ =
θ (2−θ 2)c r 1+(−8+9θ
2−2θ 4)c r 2+θ (−2+θ
2)a 1+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a 2
16−17θ 2+4θ 4
 
The profit functions Pr1-E, Pr2-E are concave to p1, p2 and their optimal solutions are:
p1−E
✳ =
(16−14θ 2+3θ 4)c r 1−2 (−3+θ
2)(−θ (−2+θ 2)cr+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)a 1+θ (−2+θ
2)a2)
64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6
p2−E
✳ =
(−2+θ 2)(2θ (−3+θ 2)c r 1+(−8+3θ
2)cr 2−2θ (−3+θ
2)a 1)−2(−3+θ
2)(8−9θ 2+2θ 4)a 2
64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6
Based on the optimal price, it can be known the optimal demand is:
Dr 1−E
✳ =
(−2+θ 2)((8−9θ 2+2θ 4)c r 1+θ (−2+θ
2)c r 2+(−8+9θ
2−2θ 4)a 1−θ (−2+θ
2)a 2)
64−148θ 2+117θ 4−37θ 6+4θ 8
,
the optimal profit of supplier is: ΠS 1−E=
(2−θ 2) [θ (θ 2−2)(c r 2−a 2)+(8−9θ
2+2θ 4)(c r 1−a1)]
2
(θ 4−5θ 2+4)(4θ 4−17θ 2+16)2
and the optimal profit of retailer is: ΠR1−E=
(−2+θ 2)2((8−9θ 2+2θ 4)(c r 1−a 1)+θ (−2+θ
2)(c r 2−a 2))
2
(1−θ 2)(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
.
5.3. “The Common Retailer” Dual-Channel Structure Model with Contract (C)
In the common retailer channel structure, it is assumed that two competing suppliers choose
the same retailer to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a iD i− bDi
2
2
)−θ Dr 1 Dr 2−∑ p iD i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2:
Dr 1−C=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−C=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−C=Dr 1−C
✳(ρ p1+w1)
Πs2−C=Dr 2−C
✳ (ρ p2+w2)
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The common retailer's profit function can be indicated as:
Πr−C=Dr 1−C ((1−ρ )p1−w1−c r )+Dr 2−C ((1−ρ)p2−w2−cr)
Lemma 3. The profit functions Ps1-C, Ps2-C are concave to w1, w2, and their optimal solution are:
w1−C=
(2+θ )(−2+2θ−ρ)c r+2 (2+θ
2(−1+ρ )−3 ρ)a1+θ (−2+ρ)a 2−4(−4+θ
2)ρ c r
2 (4−θ 2)
w2−C=
(2+θ )(−2+2θ−ρ )c r+θ (−2+ρ)a 1+2 (2+θ
2(−1+ρ)−3 ρ)a 2−4 (−4+θ
2)ρ c r
2(4−θ 2)
For the retailers, in a Nash game can find p1, p2, the corresponding optimal prices are given as
follows:
p1−C=
1
2
(a 1+c r )
p2−C=
1
2
(a 2+c r )
the optimal profit of supplier is:
ΠS 1−E=
(2−ρ )((−1+θ )cr+a 1−θ a 2)((−2+θ +θ
2)c r+2a 1−θ (θ a 1+a 2))
4(θ 4−5θ 2+4)
and the optimal profit of retailer is:
ΠR1−E=
2 (−2+θ +θ 2)(θ (−1+ρ )−ρ )c r (c r+(a 1+a 2))+(θ
2−2 ρ)a1
2−2θ (2+θ 2(−1+ρ )−3ρ )a 1a 2+(θ
2−2 ρ )a2
2
4 (4−5θ 2+θ 4)
5.4. “The Exclusive Shop” Dual-Channel Structure Model with Contract (E)
In the exclusive shop channel structure, it is assumed that two competing suppliers choose
their own retailers to sell their commodities, which p1 represents the retail price of supplier s1,
p2 represents the retail price of supplier s2. According to the consumer utility function
U∑ (a iD i− bDi
2
2
)−θ Dr 1 Dr 2−∑ p iD i (i=r1, r2) , can get the demand functions respectively for
supplier s1 and supplier s2:
Dr 1−E=
a 1−θ a 2−p1+θ p2
1−θ 2
,Dr 2−E=
a 2−θ a 1−p2+θ p1
1−θ 2
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Then, the profit functions of s1 and s2 can be expressed as:
Πs1−E=Dr 1−E
✳ (ρ P1+w1)
Πs2−E=Dr 2−E
✳ (ρ P2+w2)
The exclusive retailers’ profit functions can be indicated as:
Pr1-E = Dr1-E ((1 - r) p1 - w1 - cr1)
Pr2-E = Dr2-E ((1 - r) p2 - w2 - cr2)
Lemma 4. The profit functions Ps1-E, Ps2-E are concave to w1, w2 and their optimal solution are:
w1−E=
1
2
θ (1−ρ)(a 2−c r 2)−ρ c r 1
w2−E=
1
2
θ (1−ρ )(a 1−c r 1)−ρ c r 2
For the retailers, in a Nash game can find p1, p2, the corresponding optimal prices are given as
follows:
P1−E=
1
2
(a 1+c r 1)
P2−E=
1
2
(a 2+c r 2)
the optimal profit of supplier is: ΠS 1−E=
(c r 1−θ c r 2−a 1+θ a2)(θ (−1+ρ)cr 2+ρ a 1−θ (−1+ρ)a 2−ρ c r 1)
4 (−1+θ 2)
,
and the optimal profit of retailer is: ΠR1−E=
(c r 1−θ c r 2−a1+θ a 2)
2(1−ρ )
4(1−θ 2)
.
-470-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1320
6. Profit Distribution Proportion in Different Market Conditions
6.1. Profits Distribution Proportion Comparative Analysis on Scenario E and
Scenario C
For the comparison of suppliers’ and retailers’ profits with and without contracts under two
different channel structures, this paper is divided into three kinds of circumstances according
to the different channel cost. The first circumstance is that the channel costs are equal to zero;
the second, channel costs are not equal to zero and Cr1 = Cr2 = Cr; the last, channel cost are
not equal to zero and Cr1 = Cr2 ≠ Cr. 
6.1.1. Channel Costs Are Zero
According to the different base demand, each circumstance can be divided into three kinds:
the base demand for supplier s1 is less than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 ; the base demand for
supplier s1 and supplier s2 ’s are equal, namely
a 1
a 2
=1 ; the base demand for supplier s1 is large
than supplier s2 ’s, namely
a 1
a 2
1 .
Theorem 7. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60). 
In this case, can get the ranges of revenue sharing rates respectively in the common retailer
and the exclusive shop sales models, and the intersection of scenario C and scenario E’s
revenue sharing rates are the reasonable ranges (as shown in Table 7).
a 1
a 2
1 ρ (100θ (8−5θ
2+θ 4)+125(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(125+50θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−10θ (−2+θ 2)−5 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)(−5+10θ )2
)
a 1
a 2
=1 ρ (200θ (8−5θ
2+θ 4)+200(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2 (−4+θ 2)(200+100θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−10θ (−2+θ 2)−10 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)(−10+10θ )2
)
a 1
a 2
1 ρ (400θ (8−5θ
2+θ 4)+500(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2 (−4+θ 2)(500+200θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−10θ (−2+θ 2)−20 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)(−20+10θ )2
)
Table 7. The revenue sharing rates of different base demands
In the range of the revenue sharing rates shown in Table 7, both suppliers and retailers yield
more profits under coordination. To ensure both the supplier and retailer will participate in the
coordination, the revenue sharing rate should be in a reasonable range (as shown in Table 7);
otherwise, the disadvantaged part will deviate from the coordination.
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6.1.2. Channel Costs Are Equal to Each Other and not Zero
Theorem 8. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60). 
In this case, can get the ranges of revenue sharing rates respectively in the common retailer
and the exclusive shop sales models, and the intersection of scenario C and scenario E’s
revenue sharing rates are the reasonable ranges (as shown in Table 8).
a 1
a 2
1 ρ (−28(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+100θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+125(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(127−3θ +θ 3−15(−1+θ )2(2+θ )+50θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−9θ (−2+θ 2)−4(8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−4+9θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
a 1
a 2
=1 ρ ( −38(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+200θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+200(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(202−3θ +θ 3−20(−1+θ )2(2+θ )+100θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−9θ (−2+θ 2)−9 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−9+9θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
a 1
a 2
1 ρ ( −58(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+400θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+500(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(502−3θ +θ 3−30(−1+θ )2(2+θ)+200θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−9θ (−2+θ 2)−19 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−19+9θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
Table 8. The revenue sharing rates of different base demands
In the range of the revenue sharing rates shown in Table 8, both suppliers and retailers yield
more profits under coordination. To ensure both the supplier and retailer will participate in the
coordination, the revenue sharing rate should be in a reasonable range (as shown in Table 8);
otherwise, the disadvantaged part will deviate from the coordination.
6.1.3. Channel Costs Are not Equal to Each Other and not Zero
Theorem 9. In order to ensure that all the prices and demands are nonnegative, channel
substitutability should under the common boundary q  [0,0.60). 
In this case, can get the ranges of revenue sharing rates respectively in the common retailer
and the exclusive shop sales models, and the intersection of scenario C and scenario E’s
revenue sharing rates are the reasonable ranges (as shown in Table 9).
a 1
a 2
1 ρ (−28(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+100θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+125(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(127−3θ +θ 3−15(−1+θ )2(2+θ )+50θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−8θ (−2+θ 2)−3(8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−3+8θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
a 1
a 2
=1 ρ ( −38(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+200θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+200(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(202−3θ +θ 3−20(−1+θ )2(2+θ )+100θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−8θ (−2+θ 2)−8 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−8+8θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
a 1
a 2
1 ρ ( −58(−1+θ )
3(2+θ )2+400θ (8−5θ 2+θ 4)+500(−4−θ 2+θ 4)
2(−4+θ 2)(502−3θ +θ 3−30(−1+θ )2(2+θ)+200θ (−3+θ 2))
,1−4 (−2+θ
2)2(−8θ (−2+θ 2)−18 (8−9θ 2+2θ 4))2
(−18+8θ )2(64−84θ 2+33θ 4−4θ 6)2
)
Table 9. The revenue sharing rates of different base demands
In the range of the revenue sharing rates shown in Table 9, both suppliers and retailers yield
more profits under coordination. To ensure both the supplier and retailer will participate in the
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coordination, the revenue sharing rate should be in a reasonable range (as shown in Table 9);
otherwise, the disadvantaged part will deviate from the coordination.
7. Conclusions
Following conclusions can be drawn based on the above mentioned comparative analysis: 
• For suppliers, in the condition of Cr1=Cr2=Cr=0, can get the result that the profit of
scenario E will be greater than scenario C, no matter how the value of q (q  [0,0.60))
and a1, a2 changed; for consumers, can also get the result that the utility of scenario E
will be greater than scenario C.
• For suppliers, in the condition of Cr1=Cr2=Cr≠0, can get the result that the profit of
scenario E will be greater than scenario C, no matter how the value of q (q  [0,0.60))
and a1, a2 changed; for consumers, can also get the result that the utility of scenario E
will be greater than scenario C.
• For suppliers, in the condition of Cr1=Cr2≠Cr≠0, the profit of scenario E and scenario C
depended on the change of q. When taking a smaller value of q, they can get the result
that the profit of scenario C will be greater than scenario E; when taking a bigger value
of q, they can get the result that the profit of scenario E will be greater than scenario C.
Similarly, for consumers, the utility of scenario E and scenario C depend on the change
of q. When taking a smaller value of q, they can get the result that the utility of scenario
C will be greater than scenario E; when taking a bigger value of q, they can get the
result that the utility of scenario E will be greater than scenario C.
• Suppliers and retailers can gain more profits from coordination whether in scenario C or
scenario E. So, for suppliers and retailers, within the ranges of revenue sharing rates
solved above, participating in the coordination will always outperform than not.
• The above mentioned comparative analysis can be concluded that in the common
retailer sales model the suppliers get a greater revenue sharing rate than the retailers,
no matter how the market conditions changed. It means that the supplier’s negotiation
power is higher in the revenue sharing contracts. This conclusion just validates a
market phenomenon: the common retailer will be willing to give up some profits to
suppliers in order to attract more different suppliers to cooperate with them. 
• The above mentioned comparative analysis can be concluded that in the exclusive shop
sales model the retailers get a greater revenue sharing rate than the suppliers, no
matter how the market conditions changed. It means that the retailer’s negotiation
power is higher in the revenue sharing contracts. This conclusion just validates a
market phenomenon: supplier will be willing to give up some profits to the retailer in
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order to ensure the retailer only sell their products under the condition of revenue
sharing contracts.
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